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To what extent can a State forego its contractual commitments,
in particular those arising from a stabilization clause for human
rights and environmental protection? (“under a stabilization
clause, the host State commits itself either not to enact
changes of the domestic law in the future, or at least, not to
apply such changes to the investor”, Ohler, Concessions, Max
Planck Encyclopedia, 2009.) Our assumption is that
stabilization clauses and states’ rights to regulate should be
integrated and not be taken as opposite obligations,
considered as incompatible. In other words, if framed correctly,
stabilization clauses can balance the two conflicting needs at
stake: the sanctity of contract and a state’s right to regulate to
protect its public interest (Leben, L’évolution de la Notion de Contrat d’État , Revue de
l’arbitrage, 2003; Carbone, Luzzatto, Il Contratto internazionale, 1996; Giardina, State
Contracts, national versus international law, The Italian Yearbook of international law,
1980; Fatours, International Law and International Contract, 1980; Mann, State Contracts in
International Arbitration, 1967).
This post examines whether the (fairly) new European exclusive competence on foreign
direct investment changes the way stabilization clauses should be framed in EU State
contracts to avoid potential conflicts. There are two different kinds of possible conflicts
that could arise: first involving either provisions among themselves, or second, the two
different legal regimes at stake (the international and the European).
With respect to conflicts between European law and a State-contract provisions: a rigid
stabilization clause compels a member State to pay compensation, if requested to align
its national law to new European rules, which negatively impact foreign investment. Vice
versa when, in order to respect the stabilization clause, the same State fails to comply
with the new European provision, it may face infringement proceedings. In both
scenarios a stabilization clause, framed in a rigid way, will force a member State to
decide whether to respect a State-contract provision (such as the stabilization clause), or
a European one. As a question of principle, the State involved should let European law
prevail as a source of law higher than the one included in a State contract (whether
international, transnational or national).
For example, one can look at the potential conflict between stabilization clauses and the
recently enacted European public procurement directives (EU Directive n. 2014/24/EU;
EU Directive 2014/25/EU; EU Directive 2014/23/UE). These directives allow the inclusion in
public contracts of a sort of equilibrium clause (EU Directive 23/2014, premise n. 87 and
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art. 43); they also expressly provide the external factual conditions which allow the re-
balancing of contractual obligations (EU Directive 24/2014, premise n. 11). Lastly, they
envisage the reason which legitimize contract termination (see art. 72, directive 24/2014).
Except when expressly provided for by the normative provision, the State party should
not be precluded to enact new legislation in respect of fundamental rights.
The provisions included in the public-procurement directives render all rigid stabilization
clauses (such as those framed as freezing clauses), inconsistent with European law.
Accordingly, if they are included in a State-contract they should be deemed inapplicable
as a matter of European law prevailing over a member State’s law on questions of
principle (primauté). Any national law would have to be consistent with those that
introduce a European provision in the domestic legal order (i.e. Italy in 2015 enacted a
new Code of public procurement contracts fully consistent with EU directives).
The second kind of conflict might arise between the latest fair and equitable treatment
clauses (FET) in European agreements (CETA art. 8.10) and stabilization clauses. The FET
clause included in new European agreements (such as CETA) is well defined, reducing the
risk of the foreign State breaching the agreements for enacting legislation aimed at
protecting its public order. Therefore, if a contract signed by a member State includes a
rigid stabilization clause, the risk of inconsistency between this latter and the FET clause
is substantial.
This might lead to conflicts between systems: the international and the European. In
practical terms, a foreign investor could initiate arbitral proceedings for breach of a BIT’s
fair and equitable clause, arguing that the measure enacted by the member State
impairs its investment (protected by the BIT). In parallel, the same measure could entail a
breach of contract, as it violates the stabilization clause included therein. In case the two
above mentioned disputes arise in front of two different fora, the very same measure
could be considered in line with the FET clause and in breach of the stabilization clause,
or vice versa. This inconsistency will ultimately affect recognition and enforcement
phases of any decision over the dispute. Should a host State, for example, pay for
compensation in case the measure appears consistent with the FET clause in the arbitral
proceeding, but is simultaneously found to violate the stabilization clause in the
domestic proceeding? In the given scenario, if the State pays, it abides by the domestic
decision but acts inconsistently with the international decision.
Clearly, stabilization clauses in future public procurement contracts should be framed
consistently with the relevant European provisions and in line with the fair and equitable
clause provided in the European agreements.
If a dispute arises on the alleged violation of a contractual provision, before finding any
breach of the source at stake, I suggest that the competent forum should adopt the
proportionality approach used by the European Court of Justice, which could find a
balance between economic and non-economic values (ECJ, decision of 11 May 2000, in C-
38/98, Régie nationale des usines Renault SA v. Mexicar SpA and Orazio Formento). Similarly,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Mitsubishi, “distinguished between international arbitral awards
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that thwart the fundamental purposes of a norm that is mandatory under domestic law and
those that do not, suggesting that the latter, but not the former could be tolerated in the
interest of arbitration” (Mitsubishi Motors Corporations v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth , Inc, 473,
U.S. 614, 1985).  In the end, the broadening of European competence in external relation
increases the point of contacts among sources of law and different legal systems. The
European Union should therefore make every effort to avoid concrete and potential
inconsistencies between them (W. Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties , 1953).
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